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WAGE DISCRIMINATION IN THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL
ASSOCIATION: IS THERE DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON RACE?
SEAN D. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although a sizable majority of its players are black, the Na-
tional Basketball Association (N.B.A.) has been criticized for engag-
ing in racially discriminatory practices. In particular, the literature
has reflected a conception that a "white premium" exists in the
N.B.A. that stems from a consumer preference for white players.'
For example, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found that during the
1985-1986 N.B.A. season, black players earned about twenty percent
less in compensation than white players of equal caliber after ac-
counting for a number of performance variables in a regression
analysis. 2 Other studies finding statistical evidence of discrimina-
tion during the mid-1980s include Koch/Vander Hill (1988); Wal-
lace (1988); and Brown/Spiro/Keenan (1991).3
The goal of this paper is to determine whether wage discrimi-
nation exists today in the N.B.A. by analyzing salary data from the
1996-1997 season. An intuitive answer to this question is not easy to
* Associate, Quarles & Brady, Phoenix, AZ. J.D., Harvard Law School, cum
laude. I would like to thank Dr. W. Kip Viscusi of Harvard Law School for his
valuable assistance with the development of this paper.
1. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Kahn, Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of
the Literature, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 395, 398-412 (1991).
2. See Lawrence M. Kahn & Peter D. Sherer, Racial Differences in Professional
Basketball Players' Compensation, 6J. LAB. ECON. 40, 40 (1998). This result was statis-
tically significant at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed test. See id.
3. See, e.g., Eleanor Brown et al., Wage and Nonwage Discrimination in Profes-
sional Basketball: Do Fans Affect It?, 50 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 333; James V. Koch and
C. Warren Vander Hill, Is There Discrimination in the "Black Man's Game"?, 69 Soc.
Sci. Q. 83 (1988); Michael Wallace, Labor Market Structure and Salary Determination
Among Professional Basketball Players, 15 WoRK & OCCUPATIONS 294 (1988) (each of
these studies analyzed data from 1984-1985 N.B.A. Season).
The notion of a "white premium," however, is not universal in the literature.
Jenkins concluded that there is no significant wage difference, at least among vet-
eran free agents (even during the mid-1980s), after employing a different method-
ology. See Jeffrey A. Jenkins, A Reexamination of Salary Discrimination in Professional
Basketball, 77 Soc. Sci. Q. 594, 594. Jenkins studied players' salaries at the point of
each player's free agency over a twelve year span, rather than examining all play-
ers' salaries during a single season (approach of Kahn/Sherer and other previous
studies). See id.; Kahn & Sherer, supra note 2.
(27)
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ascertain due to competing factors regarding the likelihood of dis-
crimination today.
On the one hand, the N.B.A. has changed significantly over
the past eleven years. The league has experienced tremendous suc-
cess in the past decade and an almost six-fold increase in player
salaries since 1985-1986. 4 This success is due in large part to the
marketing and popularity of its star players, most of whom are
black. The total percentage of black players in the N.B.A. has in-
creased, as well as the number of black head coaches and general
managers. 5 The increased prevalence and success of blacks in the
N.B.A., coupled with their widespread acceptance by N.B.A. fans,
may indicate that the extent of discrimination has changed signifi-
cantly and indeed may no longer exist in professional basketball. 6
On the other hand, the greater scarcity of white players and
stars in the N.B.A. today could serve to increase the wage disparity
that existed in 1985-1986. As there are fewer white players and stars
in the league, customers' preferences to see white players, if such a
preference even exists today, may lead to an even larger "white
premium."
II. THE N.B.A. AND DISCRIMINATION LAw
The potential implications of this study are far-reaching. On
one level, it is important to determine whether an industry so open
to public scrutiny engages in wage discrimination based on race. 7
4. The 1996-1997 N.B.A. mean salary was about $2.2 million, compared to
only $375,000 in 1985-1986. See National Basketball Association Salary Report, USA
TODAY, Nov. 15, 1996, at 16C.
5. In 1985-1986, there were only two black head coaches and one black gen-
eral manager, but at the start of the 1996-1997 season, six of the N.B.A.'s head
coaches and five of its general managers were black. See Kahn and Sherer, supra
note 2, at 41; SPORTING NEWS, THE SPORTING NEWS OFcAL NBA GUIDE (1996-
1997 ed.).
6. In addition to the N.B.A.'s growth in popularity, further evidence of cus-
tomers' widespread acceptance of black stars is the magnitude of endorsement
income paid by advertisers to black N.B.A. players. See Richest of the Rich, USA To-
DAY, Dec. 4, 1995, at 13C. For example, in 1995 Michael Jordan earned $40 mil-
lion in endorsement income, while several others earned at least $2 million in
endorsements, including Shaquille O'Neal ($17 million), Grant Hill ($5 million),
Charles Barkley ($3 million), Hakeem Olajuwon ($2 million), and Patrick Ewing
($2 million). See id.
7. If in fact the N.B.A. were found to discriminate against black players, this
would raise the difficult question of a proper remedy to correct the situation. In-
creasing the number of black players in the league would be of little help (this
could actually increase the demand for the few white players remaining, assuming
discriminatory preferences exist), although a mandated increase in black players'
salaries (or a tax imposed on white players) would help alleviate such a problem if
it existed.
[Vol. 6: p. 27
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WAGE DISCRIMINATION
On another level, these results can shed light on possible consumer
racial preferences and employment discrimination for society as a
whole.
Regression analysis plays a critical role in many employment
discrimination cases.8 Plaintiffs often utilize regression models as
evidence of employment discrimination as well as to determine the
magnitude of damages. 9 Similarly, defendants may use their own
regression models to dispute the discrimination claim. In short, re-
gression analysis is used in employment discrimination cases to de-
termine whether an employer is paying workers of comparable
productivity different wages based on race or gender.
The results of this study are important to employment discrimi-
nation law in general because they provide valuable insights into
the role that race plays in wage determination. Providing informa-
tion on this process is important not only for individual employ-
ment cases but also for broad legal issues facing society, such as the
types of proof required in employment discrimination litigation as
well as the role of affirmative action in today's society.
The N.B.A. provides an excellent case study for analyzing the
influence of race in the employee wage determination process for
two reasons. First, N.B.A. players are highly visible by the consum-
ing public, indicating that customer racial preferences would be
magnified in the professional basketball industry. 10 Second, unlike
most industries, professional basketball provides a comprehensive
8. See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 385 (1986) (permitting plaintiffs
to employ multiple regression analysis to prove discriminatory wage differential
among white and black employees of North Carolina Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice); Trout v. Garrett, 780 F. Supp. 1396, 1396 (D.C. 1991) (utilizing regression
analysis to calculate amount of back pay for female civilian employees who were
victims of employment discrimination by U.S. Navy); Churchill v. IBM, Inc., 759 F.
Supp. 1089, 1089 (N.J. 1991) (using regression analysis to establish prima facie
case of gender-based wage discrimination by her employer, IBM); Vuyanich v. Re-
publican Nat'l Bank, 521 F. Supp. 656, 656 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (employing regres-
sion analysis to prove discriminatory treatment in bank's employment practices);
see also Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw
(3d ed. 1996); Michael 0. Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of Multiple Regression
Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 737 (1980); Franklin
M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980).
9. The magnitude of the variable for race (or gender) in the regression
model would determine the extent to which members of this class have been un-
derpaid, compared to workers outside the class with similar skills and productivity.
See Finkelstein, supra note 8; Fisher, supra note 8.
10. The N.B.A. provides an even better case study than most other profes-
sional sports. Professional basketball players are more highly visible on an individ-
ual basis, due to the (1) proximity of fans to the court, (2) fewer number of players
during a game, (3) absence of helmets (unlike football) and (4) extensive N.B.A.
efforts at marketing its individual players. These factors make the individual
player's personal characteristics (such as race) more important to sports fans.
1999]
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and accurate source of employee performance variables, making re-
gression results more meaningful.
III. THEORY
Employment discrimination can stem from a number of fac-
tors. While consumers' preferences are the most likely source of
any discrimination in the N.B.A., potential biases of team owners
(or possibly general managers) could also lead to a discriminatory
result.
A. Consumer Preferences
According to economic theory, consumer preference is a po-
tential source of employment discrimination."' In an idealistic
world, basketball fans desire to maximize victories or champion-
ships for their teams. Under such a scenario, N.B.A. owners would
have no financial incentive to discriminate. Owners would maxi-
mize profits by placing the best team on the floor, regardless of the
players' races. Professional basketball is in the entertainment busi-
ness, however, and basketball fans' preferences may deviate from
the victory (or championship) maximizing model discussed above.
For example, fans may be willing to pay a premium to see players
who, independent of their ability to win ball games, are flashy
dunkers or good role models in the community. Owners seeking to
maximize profits will pay these flashy dunkers and good role mod-
els a larger salary than other players of comparable skill because of
this consumer preference.' 2
N.B.A. fans may also possess a preference for white players. To
the extent that consumers are willing to pay more to see white play-
ers, N.B.A. owners acting to maximize profits will offer white players
higher salaries than black players of equal caliber. Consumers'
preferences increase the labor demand for white players beyond
the demand for their black counterparts, resulting in a higher mar-
ket wage rate for white players.
Note that it is possible that discrimination would not occur
even if fans prefer white players, however, if N.B.A. owners operate
their franchises according to motives other than profit maximiza-
tion. N.B.A. owners typically enjoy monopolistic power' 3 and will
not be driven out of business if they fail to adhere to consumer
11. See Gary Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1975).
12. "Skill" is defined as the ability to help one's team win basketball games.
13. Except for Los Angeles, each N.B.A. city has only one franchise.
[Vol. 6: p. 27
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demand. 14 Moreover, N.B.A. owners generally possess significant
wealth and can afford to forsake profits in favor of personal satisfac-
tion, which often is derived from paying above-market wages to
players who may improve the winning percentage of the team.
Consequently, N.B.A. owners operating teams as a hobby seeking to
win championships, instead of a business attempting to make a
profit, would offer identical wages to white and black players of
equal caliber, regardless of consumer preferences.
On the other hand, a profit maximizing owner would be will-
ing to deviate from the championship goal in order to satisfy con-
sumer preferences. 15 While the resulting "discrimination" in favor
of players possessing certain attributes, such as flashy dunkers and
good role models, does not seem troublesome, discrimination
based on race would pose serious legal and ethical problems.
B. Employer Preferences
Employer preferences are generally less likely to result in dis-
crimination because the discriminating employer will face higher
labor costs and be driven out of business in a competitive market.16
As discussed above, however, N.B.A. owners generally possess a lo-
cal monopoly on N.B.A. entertainment and may follow motives
other than profit maximization.' 7 Consequently, racial discrimina-
tion by owners is possible in the N.B.A. to the extent that owners
harbor a dislike for black players, even if fans do not share this pref-
erence for white players. 18
14. Note, however, that the failure of owners to adhere to consumer demand
could have the effect of curtailing owners' profits.
15. An N.B.A. owner's financial incentives to adhere to consumer demand
can be quite strong. In addition to increasing ticket revenues, N.B.A. owners who
are responsive to consumer preferences stand to benefit from larger television rev-
enue, merchandising and, perhaps most significantly, public funding of new bas-
ketball arenas.
16. See Becker, supra note 14.
17. As discussed in the preceding sub-section, N.B.A. owners typically possess
market power and thus will not be driven out of business if they fail to maximize
profits. Moreover, the owners' wealth permits them to operate their franchises as
"hobbies" rather than profit-maximizing businesses if the owners receive personal
satisfaction from following these "hobby" motives.
18. Owners who discriminate in this situation, however, would be sacrificing
other goals such as (1) profit maximization and (2) having a winning team.
Also, monopsonistic power in the labor market could theoretically lead to dis-
crimination that is based not on demand-side notions of employer/consumer pref-
erences, but rather supply-side exploitation of the labor force if "transfer
earnings," such as switching professions, are lower for blacks. SeeJ. Cairns et al.,
The Economics of Professional Team Sports: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, 13 J. ECON.
STUD. 3, 51 (1986).
1999]
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While discrimination could also occur due to the biases of a
team's general manager, this is less likely than either consumer or
owner preferences. Unlike owners, general managers do not gen-
erally possess "market power" in their positions. If a general man-
ager harbors racial prejudices and allows them to influence his
decisions, the owner can easily fire the general manager and re-
place him with somebody else who can better achieve the owner's
goal, whether that goal is maximizing profits or winning cham-
pionships.
C. Conclusion
In sum, discrimination against blacks in the N.B.A. is possible if
consumers or owners possess a preference for white players. A dis-
criminatory result is less likely, on the other hand, to stem from
racial preferences of a team's general manager.
IV. THE LABOR STRUCTURE OF THE N.B.A.1 9
In April 1983, the N.B.A. became the first league in profes-
sional sports to implement a salary cap as part of the collective bar-
gaining agreement between its players and owners. Although the
terms of the labor/management pact have changed since this
agreement, the basic salary concept has remained intact.20 Under
the salary cap, each team must not spend more than a fixed amount
($24.3 million for the 1996-1997 season) on players' salaries. The
salary cap is subject to the various exceptions which are discussed
below.
In the summer of 1996, the N.B.A. players and owners came to
terms on the current collective bargaining agreement. While some
of the loopholes have been closed by the new agreement, there are
still several salary cap exceptions that permit teams' salaries to ex-
This source of discrimination seems very unlikely in the N.B.A. today, how-
ever, for two reasons. First, the "transfer earnings" for nearly all athletes are far
below even the league minimum of $247,500, meaning that any difference be-
tween the white and black "transfer earnings" would be irrelevant. Second, an
N.B.A. owner's monopolistic power in the city's product market does not translate
into monopsonistic power in the labor market for N.B.A. players, due to the fact
that the owner must still compete with twenty-eight other teams for the services of
basketball players when they become free agents.
19. This section details the labor agreement in effect during the season used
in this paper's model (1996-1997). The N.B.A. has just agreed to a new labor
agreement in January 1999 that includes some small changes but still maintains a
salary cap with a few exceptions.
20. New collective bargaining agreements were reached in November 1988
and again in July 1996.
[Vol. 6: p. 27
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ceed the cap. In fact, only five of the N.B.A.'s 29 teams were under
the salary cap for the 1996-1997 season.2' Most significantly, the so-
called "Larry Bird" exception permits teams to sign their own free
agents for any amount they wish, regardless of whether the team's
payroll exceeds the salary cap, provided that the player has been
with the team at least three years.22
There are also several other ways to circumvent the salary cap.
For example, a player that has completed a minimum two-year con-
tract may sign a pact with his own team worth the greater of (1) the
N.B.A. average salary or (2) a seventy-five percent raise over his sal-
ary in the previous year. In addition, a team already over the salary
cap may sign free agents for contracts totaling $1 million per year.23
Finally, a team may pay rookies according to a rookie salary sched-
ule, as well as offer any veteran player the league minimum N.B.A.
salary ($247,500 for the 1996-1997 season), regardless of its salary
cap status.24
Under the collective bargaining agreement, N.B.A. players'
wages are constrained to an extent in both directions. The league
minimum salary serves as a floor 25 for the wages of lower-echelon
players, while the salary cap suppresses wages downward for certain
players to the extent the cap is not easily circumvented. 26
V. SUMMARY STATISTICS: BLACK AND WHITE PLAYERS
For the 1996-1997 season, veteran black players earned an aver-
age of $720,000 (43%) more in wages than their white counter-
21. See National Basketball Association Salary Report, supra note 4, at 16C.
22. For example, this exception permitted the Chicago Bulls to sign Michael
Jordan to a contract worth $30 million for the 1996-1997 season, despite the fact
that the Bulls were over the salary cap.
23. A team may use this exception only three times during the course of the
league's six-year collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the team must be
over the salary cap as of July 1st preceding the season and remain over the cap
thereafter.
24. See a/soJohn Davis, "Soft" Salary Cap Clears the Way for Spending Sprees, A~iz.
REPUBLIC, July 7, 1996, at C4; Jeffrey Denberg, NBA Free Agency: The Ins and Outs of
the Salary Cap, ATLANTA J. & CONSTI., July 17, 1996, at 2D; NBA Labor Chronology,
CHICAGO SUN-TiMES, June 29, 1995, at 94; Brad Townsend, Salary Cap 101: A Guide
to the Financial Complexities of the NBA, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Aug. 18, 1996, at lB.
25. The league minimum can also serve as a "ceiling" for wages, in conjunc-
tion with the salary cap, for teams that are over the cap but are still permitted to
sign additional players at the league minimum salary. See Denberg, supra note 24,
at 2D.
26. As described above, there are several significant exceptions to the salary
cap, including the "Larry Bird" exception allowing teams to re-sign their own free
agents at any price. Even these free agents are constrained to an extent, however
(at least in the short run), because they lose this "exempt" status if they sign on
with another team.
1999]
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parts. Veteran black players earned a mean salary of $2.41 million,
compared with $1.69 million for white players. Table 1 below lists
the ten highest paid white and black basketball players for the 1996-
1997 N.B.A. season.
TABLE 1: Top 10 WHITE AND BLAcK PLAYERS By SALARY
($ MILLIONS)
Black Player Salary White Player Salary
Michael Jordan 30.14 John Stockton 6.00
Horace Grant 14.86 Dino Radja 5.31
Reggie Miller 11.25 Shawn Bradley 5.13
Shaquille O'Neal 10.71 Tom Gugliotta 5.00
Gary Payton 10.21 Vlade Divac 4.72
David Robinson 9.95 Danny Ferry 4.64
Juwan Howard 9.75 Christian Laettner 4.55
Hakeem Olajuwon 9.66 Chris Dudley 4.10
Alonzo Mourning 9.38 Rik Smits 4.00
Dennis Rodman 9.00 Toni Kukoc 3.96
Although black players in the N.B.A. are, on average, compen-
sated at a higher rate than their white counterparts, this does not
preclude the possibility that employment discrimination exists
against blacks in the N.B.A. As Table 2 shows, black players, on
average, have better career statistics in many player-performance
categories.
To ascertain whether black players experience discrimination
in the N.B.A., a regression analysis is needed to account for the
various productivity variables. Such an analysis will reveal whether
black players are compensated differently than white players of
equal skill.
VI. METHODOLOGY
This model attempts to determine the driving forces (and their
magnitudes) of player wage determination in the N.B.A., in order to
determine whether a player's race has a significant role in determin-
ing his salary level. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was
run on the 1996-1997 salary27 of individual N.B.A. players against a
set of independent variables describing each player's race and value
to his team.28
27. See Team-by-Team Salaries, STAR TUBtrJE, Nov. 17, 1996, at 10C.
28. See The Sporting News Official NBA Register:. 1996-1997 Edition; The Sporting
News Official NBA Guide: 1996-1997 Edition. The players in the study were com-
prised of N.B.A. veteran players (having some N.B.A. experience leading up to the
[Vol. 6: p. 27
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The equation used for the OLS regression takes the form:
PLAYER SALARY = a + b*(PLAYER PERFORMANCE) +
c*(WHITE). In the equation, WHITE is a dummy variable repre-
senting the player's race. This variable's coefficient determines
whether wage discrimination exists in the N.B.A. today. If the
WHITE variable has a coefficient that is statistically significant, then
that would indicate that race plays a significant role in N.B.A. wage
determination. 29
PLAYER PERFORMANCE represents a series of variables mea-
suring the player's skills and value to his team. By accounting for
these variables in the model, the regression will be able to isolate
the effect of race on N.B.A. salaries.30
Table 2 contains the complete list of player performance vari-
ables, along with mean values by race. These variables are defined
and explained below.
ASSISTS PER GAME, BLOCKS PER GAME, DEFENSIVE RE-
BOUNDS PER GAME, FIELD GOAL PERCENTAGE, FREE
THROW PERCENTAGE, GAMES PER YEAR, MINUTES PER
GAME, OFFENSIVE REBOUNDS PER GAME, PERCENT DIS-
QUALIFICATIONS, PERSONAL FOULS PER GAME, POINTS PER
GAME, STEALS PER GAME, and TURNOVERS PER GAME all re-
fer to the player's career statistics leading up to the 1996-1997
N.B.A. season.
While most of these variables should be expected to have a pos-
itive impact on salary, PERCENT DISQUALIFICATIONS and
TURNOVERS PER GAME have negative connotations and would
seem to have an adverse effect on compensation.
The coefficient on MINUTES PER GAME and PERSONAL
FOULS PER GAME could be either positive or negative in theory.
Although MINUTES PER GAME reflects importance to the team, it
also may serve to diminish the accomplishments of the "per game"
variables.31 While PERSONAL FOULS PER GAME has a negative
1996-1997 season) appearing in The Sporting News Official NBA Register: 1996-1997
Edition.
29. In that case, the value of the WHITE coefficient would represent the size
of a "white premium" given to white players, over and above what comparable
black players would earn.
30. In other words, the regression will determine whether a white player will
earn more money than a black player possessing identical values for each player
performance variable.
31. For example, a player averaging 20 points per game is presumably more
impressive if he attains this point total playing an average of only 24 minutes per
game, as opposed to someone who plays the full 48 minutes and scores 20 points.
1999]
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connotation, it could have a positive effect on salary if it serves as a
proxy for a player's hustle on the defensive end of the court.
In addition, ATTENDANCE and TEAM WINNING PERCENT-
AGE refer to the 1995-1996 statistics for the team whose roster the
player appeared at the start of the 1996-1997 season. While AT-
TENDANCE presumably should have a positive effect on player sal-
ary because the team is generating more revenue, TEAM
WINNING PERCENTAGE is ambiguous in theory. Although
TEAM WINNING PERCENTAGE may be positively-signed if win-
ning teams reward their players for winning, it is possible that such
teams may be over the salary cap and (to the extent that the cap can
not be circumvented) thus be limited in the amount of money they
can spend on player salaries. 32
The players' HEIGHT (in inches), DRAFT POSITION, and
YEARS IN LEAGUE were also included in the model as measures of
a player's importance to his team. While HEIGHT presumably has
a positive effect on salary, DRAFT POSITION should have an ad-
verse impact on wages because of the way in which the variable is
defined (the order of selection in the draft) .3 YEARS IN LEAGUE
is ambiguous in theory. Although the player gains experience the
longer he plays, his skills may also begin to diminish after a certain
point.
Finally, the model includes some variables to account for the
players' position and league awards received. CENTER and FOR-
WARD are dummy variables representing the player's primary posi-
tion,34 on the theory that there may be a financial premium paid
for players of certain positions. MVP represents the number of
times a player has earned the league's Most Valuable Player award,
while ALL NBA TEAM is a dummy variable signifying whether a
player has been selected to the All-N.B.A. team. 35
32. For example, as discussed in the Section IV of the paper, teams can re-
sign their own free agents for an unlimited amount of money under the "Larry
Bird" exception to the salary cap. The salary cap would potentially be a constraint
even in these situations, however, because signing its veterans to large contracts
may keep the team over the salary cap for years to come, limiting the team's ability
to sign new free agents.
33. Thus, the best players (or these perceived as possessing the most potential
entering the draft) are taken early in the draft, giving these players low DRAFT
POSITION numbers.
34. The "primary position" is defined as the position listed first for that player
in The Sporting News Official NBA Register: 1996-1997 Edition.
35. The player has been selected to either the first, second, or third AIl-N.B.A.
team.
[Vol. 6: p. 27
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As discussed above, the primary reason for including these
player performance variables is to isolate the effect of race on
N.B.A. salaries.3 6 While the directions of the player performance
variables may be complicated and reflect competing factors, the im-
portant thing is to control for all of these variables in order to de-
termine whether black players are compensated less than white
players of equal caliber.
TABLE 2: PLAYER PERFORMANCE VARIABLE MEANS (By RACE)
Variable Mean (Black) Mean (White) Difference*
Assists per game 2.43 1.74 +0.69
Attendance 7.1 E+5 7.2 E+5 -0.1 E+5
Blocks per game 0.57 0.50 +0.07
Center 0.10 0.42 -0.32
Def. rebounds per game 2.92 2.56 +0.36
Draft position 20.59 28.29 -7.70
Field goal percentage 46.32 47.03 -0.71
Forward 0.44 0.26 +0.18
Free throw percentage 72.31 72.78 -0.47
Games per year 64.92 59.45 +5.47
Height 78.63 81.03 -2.40
Minutes per game 24.52 19.61 +4.91
Off. rebounds per game 1.45 1.18 +0.27
Disqualification percentage 2.41 2.66 -0.25
Personal fouls per game 2.34 2.20 +0.14
Points per game 10.66 8.01 +2.65
Steals per game 0.88 0.64 +0.24
Turnovers per game 1.65 1.28 +0.37
Team winning percentage 50.42 51.97 -1.55
Years in league 5.56 5.39 +0.17
MVP 0.03 0.00 +0.03
All NBA Team 0.10 0.07 +0.03
* Note: Difference = Mean(Black) - Mean(White)
VII. RESULTS
According to the regression results (see Table 3 below), race
does not play a significant role in wage determination in the N.B.A.
today. Although the coefficient on the WHITE variable is positively
signed, it is statistically insignificant. The variable's standard error
(0.2677) is roughly 4.5 times as large as its magnitude (0.060), and
its p-values are 0.412 (1-tailed) and 0.823 (2-tailed). In other words,
36. Although, it is also interesting to analyze how factors other than race im-
pact the salaries of N.B.A. players.
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the null hypothesis that no discrimination exists can not be rejected
at the 0.05 level or any other reasonable level of inquiry.
The insignificance of the WHITE variable is robust to a
number of variations of the model, including the (1) use of the
natural log of salary as the dependent variable; (2) inclusion of
squared variables in the model; (3) removal of subjective variables
that could potentially mask discrimination; and (4) removal of vari-
ables that were not in the Kahn/Sherer (1988) model (see
APPENDIX).
In short, the results suggest that significant wage discrimina-
tion based on race no longer exists in the N.B.A. While the litera-
ture found a significant "white premium" in the N.B.A. during the
mid-1980s, black players today are compensated approximately the
same as white players of equal caliber. This apparent transforma-
tion over the past decade may be due to a number of factors, such
as (1) a heightened desire on the part of the owners or consumers
to have a winning team, regardless of the team's racial composition;
and (2) greater acceptance and popularity of black players among
N.B.A. fans.
VIII. DATA ANALYSIS OF OTHER VARIABLES
Table 3, above, presents the regression results for each of the
player productivity variables as well as the WHITE variable. AS-
SISTS PER GAME, BLOCKS PER GAME, CENTER, FORWARD,
HEIGHT, OFFENSIVE REBOUNDS PER GAME, PERSONAL
FOULS PER GAME, POINTS PER GAME, TEAM WINNING PER-
CENTAGE, YEARS IN LEAGUE, MVP, and ALL NBA TEAM are all
significant factors in determining an N.B.A. player's level of
compensation.3 7
As the table indicates, an N.B.A. player earns $148,000 for an
extra point per game in career statistics.38 Additional assists per
game are worth $465,000 apiece, blocks $623,000, offensive re-
37. They are significant factors for at least at the 0.05 level for a 1-tailed test or
at the 0.10 level for a 2-tailed test.
38. Note that many of these coefficients are quite large. This stems signifi-
candy from the fact that N.B.A. salaries are so big. The large coefficients are also
due in part to the fact that the regression produced an extremely large negative
constant (-$9.213 million). In other words, the model assumes that a "nonexis-
tent" N.B.A. player (i.e., one who has no statistics, plus has a height of zero inches)
loses roughly $9 million annually. A large portion of this negative constant is
made up for by the way the height variable is set up, however, because all players
have over 60 inches of height. For example, a player who is 6 foot 6 inches tall
with no statistics (he never plays, never scores, etc.), will "lose" only about $1.65
million under the regression model.
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TABLE 3: REGRESSION RESULTS (MILLIONS)
Variable
Assists per game
Attendance
Blocks per game
Center
Defensive Rebounds per game
Draft position
Field goal percentage
Forward
Free throw percentage
Games per year
Height
Minutes per game
Offensive rebounds per game
Disqualification percentage
Personal fouls per game
Points per game
Steals per game
Turnovers per game
Team winning percentage
Years in league
MVP
All NBA Team
White
Constant
P
+0.465
-7.03 E-7
+0.623
-0.877
-0.172
-0.007
+0.014
-0.547
+0.011
-0.008
+0.097
+0.024
+0.948
-0.140
+0.596
+0.148
-0.622
-0.870
+0.017
-0.116
+5.114
+0.908
+0.060
-9.213
* Significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed test).
** Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test).
*** Significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed test).
**** Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test).
bounds $948,000, and personal fouls $596,000. N.B.A. players also
gain, on average, $97,000 for an additional inch of height and re-
ceive an extra $17,000 for a one percent increase in his team's win-
ning percentage.
N.B.A. players lose $870,000 for every turnover per game and
another $116,000, on average, for each year they have spent in the
league. In addition, a one percent increase in the player's DIS-
QUALIFICATION PERCENTAGE leads to a $140,000 reduction in
pay. The player also loses $877,000 if he is a center or $547,000 if
he is a forward.
Finally, the star performers reap $5,114,000 annually for each
time they have earned the league MVP award and $908,000 if they
have been selected at least once to the All N.B.A. team.
While the signs on many of these variables come as no surprise
(TURNOVERS PER GAME is negative, while ASSISTS PER GAME,
Standard Error (0)
0.1265****
7.539 E-7
0.2524***
0.4867*
0.1684
0.0049
0.0267
0.3264*
0.0149
0.0093
0.0567*
0.0430
0.2886****
0.0703**
0.3478*
0.0613***
0.3801
0.3640****
0.0060**
0.0296****
0.4317****
0.4004**
0.2677
4.7494
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BLOCKS PER GAME, HEIGHT, OFFENSIVE REBOUNDS PER
GAME, POINTS PER GAME, MVP, and ALL NBA are positive),
other variables provide insights worth mentioning.
For example, CENTER and FORWARD are both negative, sug-
gesting that there is a premium on guards in the N.B.A. 39 YEARS
IN LEAGUE is also negatively signed, which may lend some
credence to a perception among many that younger players are tak-
ing a disproportionate share of revenue. 40 TEAM WINNING PER-
CENTAGE, on the other hand, increases a player's salary,
indicating that winning teams tend to reward their players with
larger salaries despite the potential salary cap constraints on teams
with expensive payrolls.
PERSONAL FOULS PER GAME is positively signed, probably
because personal fouls is a proxy for a player's defensive effort. Ex-
cessive personal fouls can have an adverse effect on a player's salary,
however, as evidenced by the negative sign on PERCENT
DISQUALIFICATIONS.
It is also interesting to note which variables in the model are
not statistically significant, namely, ATTENDANCE, DEFENSIVE
REBOUNDS PER GAME, DRAFT POSITION, FIELD GOAL PER-
CENTAGE, FREE THROW PERCENTAGE, GAMES PER YEAR,
MINUTES PER GAME, 4 1 STEALS PER GAME, and, as already dis-
cussed, WHITE.
Finally, the regression model features several new variables that
were not included in Kahn and Sherer's study of the 1985-1986
N.B.A. salaries. As discussed earlier in this section, each of these
new variables - HEIGHT, PERCENT DISQUALIFICATIONS,
TURNOVERS PER GAME, MVP, and ALL N.B.A. - is statistically
significant. 42 Nevertheless, the WHITE variable remains statistically
insignificant after these variables are removed from the equation
(see APPENDIX).
39. And, to a lesser extent, forwards, since the negative magnitude on FOR-
WARD (-0.547) is less than that on CENTER.
40. This result may be justified if players' diminishing skills outweigh experi-
ence gained from playing additional years in the league.
41. The MINUTES PER GAME variable may be accounting for two differing
aspects of a player's game that tend to cancel each other out in this model. While
MINUTES PER GAME may signify a player's importance to his time, it may also
make his per game statistics less impressive because it would take more minutes to
attain these per game results (as discussed in the METHODOLOGY section).
42. Each is significant at least at the 0.05 level under a 1-tailed test or at the
0.10 level under a 2-tailed test.
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IX. EXTENSION OF THE MODEL
The regression was re-run for each team after adding both (1)
a dummy variable and (2) a TEAM*WHITE interaction variable for
the team. The motivation behind this inquiry was twofold: First, do
certain teams pay their players higher levels of compensation, after
accounting for the individuals' skill and productivity? Second, even
though the results of this paper indicate that race does not play a
significant role in determining wages in the league as a whole, do
teams discriminate on an individual basis?
A. General Team Effects
With regard to the first question, it appears that there is no
significant pay differential among teams for players of equal caliber.
None of the team coefficients were significant at the 0.05 level
under a two-tailed test. Moreover, only two teams (the Indiana Pac-
ers and the Washington Bullets43 ) were significant under a one-
tailed test, and for both the results largely reflect the fact that the
teams just re-signed star players over the summer to very lucrative
contracts.44 While some N.B.A. teams have higher total payrolls
than others, the results suggest that this discrepancy disappears af-
ter accounting for player productivity.
B. Teams Interacted with Race
The TEAM*WHITE interaction variables similarly failed to
produce statistically significant results. None of the teams were sta-
tistically significant at the 0.05 level under a two-tailed test. Only
two teams had significant race interaction variables under a one-
tailed test, and neither team appears guilty of any racial dis-
crimination.
The Sacramento Kings appear at first to have a positive "white
premium" but have only one white player on their roster (Bobby
Hurley) whose situation does not appear to be motivated by race.45
The other team, the Washington Bullets, actually appears at first to
pay a "black premium" for its players. This seems equally implausi-
ble, especially since the Bullets have three white players on their
43. Since this model was developed, the Washington Bullets have changed
their franchise's name to the Washington Wizards.
44. The two stars are Reggie Miller and Juwan Howard, respectively.
45. Hurley signed a lucrative contract as a promising rookie but thereafter
suffered a life-threatening car accident that has hampered his career to date, mak-
ing him overpaid in the model.
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roster. 46 A word of caution is in order about these general results,
however, because the sample of white players for each team is very
small. The failure to find discrimination by any individual teams
could merely be due to an insufficient number of data points.
X. THE ALL STAR TEAM: PROJECTED VERSUS ACTUAL SALARIES
The regression results can also be used to calculate the pro-
jected salaries for the All Star team. Tables 4 and 5 below compare
the actual and projected salaries for the 1996-1997 N.B.A. starting
All Star squads as well as the Most Valuable Player of the game.
TABLE 4: 1996-1997 WESTERN CONFERENCE ALL STAR STARTING
LINEUP ACTuAL AND PROJECTED SALARIES ($ MILLIONS)
Player Actual Projected Difference
Gary Payton 10.21 5.09 +5.12
Hakeem Olajuwon 9.66 11.41 -1.76
John Stockton 6.00 4.61 +1.39
*Charles Barkley 4.70 10.59 -5.90
Karl Malone 4.66 5.06 -0.40
Shawn Kemp 3.30 4.40 -1.10
* Was voted in as the starter in the All Star Game but did not play due to injury.
TABLE 5:1996-1997 EASTERN CONFERENCE ALL STAR STARTING
LINEUP (AND MVP) ACTuAL AND PROJECTED SALARIES ($ MILLIONS)
Player Actual Projected Difference
Michael Jordan 30.14 27.48 2.66
Reggie Miller 11.25 4.33 6.92
Dikembe Mutombo 8.01 6.28 1.74
Anfernee Hardaway 6.66 6.43 0.22
Grant Hill 5.03 4.74 0.28
*Patrick Ewing 3.00 5.22 -2.22
**Glen Rice 4.00 3.40 0.60
* Was voted in as the starter in the All Star Game but did not play due to injury.
** Did not start in the All Star Game but won the game's Most Valuable Player
Award.
As the tables show, Reggie Miller is the most overpaid player
starting in the All Star Game, according to the model, earning
$11.25 million in 1996-1997 despite a projected salary of only $4.33
million. Miller is followed closely by Gary Payton, whose actual sal-
46. The apparent "black premium" is largely due to the re-signing of Juwan
Howard to an expensive contract last summer.
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ary ($10.21 million) is roughly double that projected by the model
($5.09 million). On the other hand, Charles Barkley is the most
underpaid of the All Star starters,47 with an actual salary ($4.70 mil-
lion) of less than half his projected value ($10.59 million).
These extreme examples illustrate how timing can play a criti-
cal role in determining an N.B.A. player's compensation level. Reg-
gie Miller and Gary Payton recently signed lucrative contracts
during the summer of 1996, while Charles Barkley remains obli-
gated to an earlier contract paying him significantly less money.
Also of interest is the 1996-1997 All Star Game's Most Valuable
Player, Glen Rice, who earns a salary ($4.00 million) fairly close to
that projected by the model ($3.40 million). The same holds true
for Michael Jordan, the league's top player, whose projected salary
($27.48 million) is only slightly less (in percentage terms) than his
record-setting $30.14 million one-year contract.
XI. CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to determine whether wage discrimination
exists today in the N.B.A. by employing a regression analysis on
1996-1997 N.B.A. player salaries against a set of productivity vari-
ables and race.
Although roughly 80% of N.B.A. players are black, the league
has been accused in the past of discriminatory employment prac-
tices. In particular, Kahn and Sherer (1988) found a statistically
significant "premium" paid to white players during the 1985-1986
N.B.A. season.
According to the current OLS regression analysis of the 1996-
1997 season, however, race is not a significant factor in the determi-
nation of N.B.A. players' salaries. Although the coefficient on the
WHITE variable is positive, its standard error is roughly 4.5 times as
large as the magnitude of the coefficient. With p-values of 0.412 (1-
tailed) and 0.823 (2-tailed), the variable is not statistically signi-
ficant.
In short, black and white players of equal skill and productivity
are compensated approximately the same, suggesting that the Na-
tional Basketball Association does not engage in wage discrimina-
tion today.
47. Charles Barkley was voted as a starter in the 1996-1997 All Star Game by
the fans but did not play due to injury.
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XII. APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
To test the robustness of the result that the WHITE variable is
not statistically significant, several alternative regression models
were run. The WHITE variable remained statistically insignificant
in each of these model reformulations, supporting the result that
race does not play a significant role in wage determination in the
N.B.A. today.
A. LN (Salary)
First, the model was re-run using the natural log of salary in
order to mitigate the effect that oufliers may have on the results.
The results appear in Table A-1. WHITE remains positive but statis-
tically insignificant, with p-values of 0.35 (1-tailed) and 0.69 (2-
tailed).
DRAFT POSITION and GAMES PER YEAR gain significance
under this model at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively, under a
two-tailed test. On the other hand, several variables lose their sig-
nificance - BLOCKS PER GAME, CENTER, FORWARD,
HEIGHT, DISQUALIFICATION PERCENTAGE, PERSONAL
FOULS PER GAME, TEAM WINNING PERCENTAGE, MVP, and
ALL NBA TEAM. Finally, ASSISTS PER GAME, OFFENSIVE RE-
BOUNDS PER GAME, POINTS PER GAME, TURNOVERS PER
GAME, and YEARS IN LEAGUE retain their statistical significance
under this model. 48
B. Inclusion of Squared Variables
In addition, the original regression model was run again ad-
ding squared variables for many of the player performance charac-
teristics. The theory behind this approach is that squared variables
may be a more accurate measure of the value to team, due to the
fact that incremental changes in these variables' values may become
increasingly more important at higher levels of productivity. 49
Table A-2 below presents the results from the "squared vari-
ables" regression. The WHITE variable remains statistically insignif-
48. Each variable is significant at the 0.05 level or better under either a I-
tailed or 2-tailed test.
49. For example, the difference between scoring 25 points per game and 20
points per game may be of greater importance than the difference between scor-
ing 10 points per game versus 5 points per game, on the theory that there is a
premium on players at the highest levels of productivity because they are more
difficult to come by.
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TABLE A-1: LN(SALARY)
Regression Results - Ln ($ Millions)
Variable
Assists per game
Attendance
Blocks per game
Center
Defensive rebounds per game
Draft position
Field goal percentage
Forward
Free throw percentage
Games per year
Height
Minutes per game
Offensive rebounds per game
Disqualification percentage
Personal fouls per game
Points per game
Steals per game
Turnovers per game
Team win percentage
Years in league
MVP
All NBA Team
White
Constant
P
+0.159
+3.13 E-8
+0.162
-0.291
-0.039
-0.006
+0.005
-0.206
+0.005
+0.007
+0.032
+0.014
+0.325
-0.009
+0.152
+0.071
-0.119
-0.379
+0.003
-0.056
+0.182
+0.167
+0.048
-4.380
icant under this model, with p-values of 0.43
tailed).
(1-tailed) and 0.86 (2-
This "squared variables" regression was also re-run using the
natural log of salary as the dependent variable. WHITE remained
statistically insignificant, with p-values of 0.34 (1-tailed) and 0.68 (2-
tailed) .50
C. Removal of Subjective Variables
The model was run again after removing variables (DRAFT
POSITION, ALL STAR TEAM, and MVP) that reflect subjectivity
and the potential for racial bias. The motivation behind this refor-
mulation is that the inclusion of such variables in the model could
mask racial biases by N.B.A. teams in drafting players5 1 or by sports
50. The WHITE coefficient = 0.050, standard error = 0.1232, T-statistic =
0.41).
51. Racial discrimination could take the form of teams selecting white players
ahead of black players of equal caliber in the N.B.A. draft.
Standard Error (0)
0.0576
3.433 E-7
0.1149
0.2216
0.0767
0.0022
0.0122
0.1486
0.0068
0.0042
0.0258
0.0196
0.1314
0.0320
0.1584
0.0279
0.1731
0.1658
0.0027
0.0135
0.1966
0.1823
0.1219
2.1625
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TABLE A-2: INCLUSION OF SQUARED VARIABLES
Regression Results (Millions)
Variable Standard Error ([)
Assists per game +0.437 0.2809
(Assists per game)2  -0.005 0.0239
Attendance -7.03 E-7 7.515 E-7
Blocks per game +0.363 0.5705
(Blocks per game)2  +0.063 0.1743
Center -0.998 0.5092
Defensive rebounds per game +0.101 0.4859
(Defensive rebounds per game) 2  -0.039 0.0519
Draft position -0.017 0.0105
(Draft position) 2  +9.40 E-5 7.875 E-5
Field goal percentage +0.026 0.0272
Forward -0.487 0.3452
Free throw percentage +0.012 0.0154
Games per year -0.004 0.0094
Height +0.128 0.0625
Minutes per game +0.049 0.0503
Offensive rebounds per game -0.265 0.7365
(Offensive rebounds per game)2  +0.296 0.1556
Disqualification percentage -0.135 0.0714
Personal fouls per game +0.598 0.3503
Points per game -0.044 0.1500
(Points per game) 2  +0.007 0.0049
Steals per game -2.340 1.0871
(Steals per game) 2  +0.835 0.4310
Turnovers per game +0.039 0.9471
(Turnovers per game) 2  -0.207 0.2151
Team winning percentage +0.014 0.0061
Years in league -0.106 0.0302
MVP +4.165 0.5802
All NBA Team +0.448 0.4475
White +0.048 0.2685
Constant -11.279 5.1741
writers in selecting the recipients of the MVP award and members
of the All N.B.A. team.
The results from this regression appear in Table A-3 below.
The WHITE variable has a negative coefficient under this model
but again remains statistically insignificant, with p-values of 0.43 (1-
tailed) and 0.87 (2-tailed).
The "removal of subjective variables" regression was also re-run
using the natural log of salary as the dependent variable. WHITE
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remained statistically insignificant, with p-values of 0.38 (1-tailed)
and 0.76 (2-tailed).52
TABLE A-3: REMOVAL OF SUBJECTIVE VARIABLES
Regression Results (Millions)
Variable Standard Error ([)
Assists per game +0.665 0.1427
Attendance +5.14 E-8 0.2940
Blocks per game +0.829 0.2940
Center -0.697 0.5485
Defensive rebounds per game +0.050 0.1983
Field goal percentage +0.001 0.0289
Forward -0.517 0.3665
Free throw percentage +0.006 0.0156
Games per year +8.98 E-5 0.0095
Height +0.094 0.0621
Minutes per game -0.184 0.0444
Offensive rebounds per game +1.091 0.3275
Disqualification percentage -0.160 0.0802
Personal fouls per game +0.705 0.3875
Points per game +0.484 0.0609
Steals per game +0.460 0.4315
Turnovers per game -1.696 0.4028
Team winning percentage +0.017 0.0068
Years in league -0.113 0.0338
White -0.050 0.3000
Constant -8.770 5.2761
D. Removal of Variables Not in the Kahn/Sherer Study
Finally, the model was run again after dropping variables that
did not appear in Kahn and Sherer's (1988) study of the 1985-1986
season. 53 The goal of this model reformulation is to determine
whether the different result obtained in this paper (that WHITE is
insignificant in the 1996-1997 salary structure) is the result of a
slightly different model, or rather a true change in the N.B.A. over
the past 11 years.
Table A-4 below presents the results from this regression.
Although its T-statistic is larger than in the model presented in the
52. The WHITE coefficient = -0.035, standard error = 0.1171, T-statistic =
-0.30).
53. The variables are HEIGHT, DISQUALIFICATION PERCENTAGE,
TURNOVERS PER GAME, ALL NBA TEAM, and MVP. This regression was run
using In(salary) as the dependent variable in order to parallel the Kahn/Sherer
study. WHITE is still statistically insignificant when this regression is run with sal-
ary as the dependent variable.
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text of this paper, the WHITE variable is still statistically insignifi-
cant.5 4 In contrast, the Kahn/Sherer study of 1985-1986 player sal-
aries found strong evidence of a "white premium" that was
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
In short, race is statistically insignificant in 1996-1997 under a
model closely approximating the Kahn/Sherer model that found
significant evidence of racial discrimination during the 1985-1986
season. This suggests that the N.B.A.'s compensation of black play-
ers relative to whites has indeed changed significantly over the past
eleven years.
TABLE A-4: REMOVAL OF VARiABLEs NOT IN THE
KAHN/SHERER STUDY
Regression Results - Ln ($ Millions)
Variable 13 Standard Error (13)
Assists per game +0.065 0.0420
Attendance +4.39 E-8 3.444 E-7
Blocks per game +0.182 0.1113
Center -0.142 0.1984
Defensive rebounds per game -0.061 0.0748
Draft position -0.006 0.0022
Field goal percentage +0.012 0.0119
Forward -0.111 0.1338
Free throw percentage +0.004 0.0067
Games per year +0.009 0.0042
Minutes per game +0.011 0.0170
Offensive rebounds per game +0.326 0.1292
Personal fouls per game +0.037 0.0977
Points per game +0.058 0.0200
Steals per game -0.044 0.1639
Team winning percentage +0.004 0.0027
Years in league -0.049 0.0133
White +0.105 0.1138
Constant -2.326 0.7469
54. As Table A-4 shows, the standard error for the WHITE variable in this
regression is larger than the coefficient itself. In contrast, the race variable in
Kahn/Sherer's study of 1985-1986 data had a coefficient that was just over three
times the magnitude of its coefficient.
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